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Abstract. The eventological theory of decision-making, the theory of event-based decision-making is a theory
of decision-making based on eventological principles and using results of mathematical eventology [1]; a
theoretical basis of the practical eventology [2, 3, 4]. The beginnings of this theory which have arisen from
event-based representation of the reasonable subject and his decisions in the form of eventological distributions
(E-distributions) of sets of events [5] and which are based on the eventological H-theorem [6] are offered. The
illustrative example of the eventological decision-making by the reasonable subject on his own event-based
behaviour in the financial or share market is considered.
Keywords. Eventology, event-based decision-making, eventological H-theorem.
1. Event circumstances
The reasonable subject makes a decision at the coincidence of a set of events-circumstances
which is generated by his surrounding events. The reasonable subject looks at his surrounding
events through a prism of the set of events F ⊆ F, chosen by him from the algebra of events
F of the eventological space (E-space) (Ω,F ,P). Then during some moment t ∈ T coming
this or that event-terrace ter(Ft), Ft ⊆ F will be always unequivocal to correspond to any
coincidence of a set of events-circumstances. Therefore we shall agree to name these events-
terraces ter(Ft) as coincidences of a set of events-circumstances during the moment t ∈ T
generated by the set of events F which in turn we shall name the set of events-circumstances
for brevity.
2. Event decisions
Let’s assume also that at the full order of the reasonable subject there is a set of events-
decisions D ⊆ F chosen by him from the same algebra of events F . Each subset D ⊆ D
corresponds to this or that set event-based decision (the E-set-decision) of the reasonable
subject. Approaches or non-approaches of separate events-decisions d ∈ D, generated by a
choice of the reasonable subject, mutually unequivocally characterize each his E-set-decision
D ⊆ D. Making by reasonable subject the E-set-decision D means, that the reasonable
subject chooses separate events-decisions d ∈ D in such a manner that there come all
2events-decisions from D and any of Dc = D−D. The reasonable subject creates all events-
decisions from D and any of Dc = D−D. Differently, the reasonable subject creates one of
events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D, generated by the set of events-decisions D.
Choosing or not choosing1 separate events-decisions d ∈ D during each moment t ∈ T ,
the reasonable subject as a result gets an ability make an eventological choice — an ability
to choose events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D according to the E-distribution of set of events-
decisions D ⊆ F, i.e. gets an ability to make the E-set-decisions D ⊆ D included in D
according to the E-distribution of D.
3. The assumption of the stationarity of sets of events
In the beginning we shall assume for simplicity that the set of events-decisions D and the
set of events-circumstances F do not depend on time. In other words, we shall assume a
stationarity of E-distributions of D and F, i.e. — their invariance in time.
4. A problem of eventological decisions-making
(E-decisions-making)
The problem of eventological decisions-making (E-decisions-making) by the reasonable subject
consists in his choice (for the set of events-circumstances F) of a such set of events-decisionsD
of which E-distribution represents for the reasonable subject the greatest value as his event-
based answer to a call of F generated by surrounding events. An ability of the reasonable
subject to choose the set of events-decisions D with that or other E-distribution is equivalent
to him ability to choose the E-set-decision D ⊆ D eventologically (event-based probabilistically),
i.e. — to choose a way of his own event-based behaviour within the limits of the set of events-
decisions D in eventological manner ; — to choose a way which is his event-based answer to
the call of any coincidence of events-circumstances F ⊆ F of his surrounding events.
4.1. The choice of events-decisions
The choice by the reasonable subject of an event-decision d ∈ D at the coincidence of a set
of events-circumstances ter(F ) is eventologically fixed by the special indicator function of
two arguments: an event-decision d and an event-terrace ter(F ), which is defined on D× F
through the Riemann’s2 zeta-function ζ defined on F × F :
1d(ter(F )) = ζ
(
ter(F ), d
)
=
{
1, ter(F ) ⊆ d,
0, otherwise.
For any pair (d, F ) ∈ D× 2F ⊆ D× F we shall use the abbreviated designation:
1d(F ) = 1d(ter(F )),
1according to that or other coincidence of a set of events-circumstances to which an event-terraces ter(Ft)
corresponds.
2Riemann, Georg Friedrich Bernhard (1826–1866) was a German mathematician who made important
contributions to analysis and differential geometry, some of them paving the way for the later development
of general relativity.
3and shall keep this abbreviation as well for the so-called set-indicator function
1d(F ) =
{
Ω, ter(F ) ⊆ d,
∅, otherwise,
hoping, that the context in which it will be used, will help us to avoid misunderstanding.
The just entered set-display function allows us to construct each event-decision d ∈ D
from events-terraces ter(F ), F ⊆ F mathematically by the formula:
d =
∑
F⊆F
ter(F ) ∩ 1d(F ), (1)
which can be written down in equivalent form by means of the indicator function in more
bulky kind however:
d =
∑
F : 1d(F )>0
ter(F ). (1′)
Remark 1. Formulas (1) and (1′) define each event-decision d ∈ D as a union of this or
that set of events-terraces ter(F ). In other words, events-decisions d ∈ D appear combined
of events-terraces ter(F ), generated by the set of events-circumstances F, in such a manner
that each event-terrace ter(F ) or is completely contained in the event-decision d, or is not
intersected with it. This fact allows to enter one more indicator function:
1D(ter(F )) = ζ
(
ter(F ), ter(D)
)
=
{
1, ter(F ) ⊆ ter(D),
0, otherwise
which we shall designate in abbreviated form
1D(F ) = 1D(ter(F )),
hoping that it also will not cause misunderstanding.
If to take advantage of more correct, but bulky writing
1D(ter(F )) = 1ter(D)(ter(F )),
then 1D(F ) can be considered as the indicator function as original generalization of 1d(F ).
These functions are connected by a relation:
1d(F ) =
∑
ter(D)⊆d
1ter(D)(ter(F )) =
∑
d∈D
1D(F )
by virtue of that
{ter(D) ⊆ d} ⇐⇒ {d ∈ D}.
Remark 2. Formulas (1) and (1′) define the set of events-decisions D through the set
of events-circumstances F. The inverse formulas are possible when there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of nonempty events-terraces ter(D), D ⊆ D and the set of
nonempty events-terraces ter(F ), F ⊆ F.
44.2. The eventological choice
The choice by the reasonable subject of events-decisions, which all together form the set D,
enable him an eventological choice of any E-set-decision D ⊆ D which is interpreted (by
one-to-one way) as creation of event-terrace by the reasonable subject:
ter(D) =
⋂
d∈D
d
⋂
d∈Dc
dc
where events-decisions d ∈ D are defined by formulas (1) or (1′) in full correspondence with
his eventological choice.
Let’s designate
p =
{
p(F ) = P(ter(F )), F ⊆ F
}
E-distribution of the set of events-circumstances F. Then the E-distribution
q =
{
q(D) = P(ter(D)), D ⊆ D
}
of the set of events-decisions D is connected with the E-distribution p by formulas:
q(D) =
∑
F⊆F
p(F )1D(F ), D ⊆ D, (2)
which allow to speak that the reasonable subject (choosing separate events-decisions d ∈
D, in other words, choosing this or that E-set-decision D ⊆ D) shows his ability of the
eventological choice — his ability of the E-decisions-making answering on a call of the E-
distribution of F, the set of events-circumstances.
5. E-decisions-making methods
5.1. Value of an event
A value of event [1, 5] is a one of essential properties of event, co-being of the reasonable
subject; a propensity of event to have the importance, to be important for the reasonable
subject; that is inherent in event, makes its concrete existence; without a value an event
cannot exist; characterizes a degree of value for reasonable subject «to be with», to perceive
and/or to create an event as an outcome of the being; opens a value of dual event in concepts
of a value of perception and a value of creation of event by the reasonable subject; reflects two
opposite basic relations between mind and Being; underlies the eventological laws describing
the nature of objective and subjective uncertainty; mathematically it is connected with
Kolmogorov’s3 probability by the relation value∼probability [1].
5.2. The greatest value principle
We shall make bold to approve that so called the greatest value principle serves as a basis of
an eventological choice. Differently, making the eventological choice, the reasonable subject
recognizes that the event-based outcome of his choice should possess the greatest value from
his point of view. Thus a sense of the greatest value of eventological choice in details to
specify there is no necessity: the reasonable subject defines it for himself.
3Kolmogorov, Andrey Nickolaevich (1903–1987) was the great Russian mathematician; the founder of
modern probability theory; worked in the field of topology, logic, the theory of turbulence, the theory of
complexity of algorithms and in many others.
55.3. The matrix of a joint E-distribution for D and F
Let’s consider the matrix of a joint E-distribution for the set of events-decisions D and the
set of events-circumstances F:
‖pi(D,F )‖ =
{
pi(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F
}
, (pi)
where4
pi(D,F ) = P(ter(D) ∩ ter(F ))
is a probability of joint coming events-terraces ter(D) and ter(F ).
5.4. The greatest valuable conditional E-distributions of D
For each event-terrace ter(F ) (which has a positive probability p(F ) > 0) conditional
probabilities
q(D|F ) = P
(
ter(D)
∣∣∣ ter(F )) = pi(D,F )
p(F )
of reasonable subject choice of the E-set-decision D ⊆ D at coincidence of a set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F are defined. Conditional E-distributions{
q(D|F ), D ⊆ D}, F ⊆ F (?)
are those the greatest valuable (for the reasonable subject) E-distributions which are formed5
by him when he eventologically chooses E-set-decisions D ⊆ D, answering coincidence of a
set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. We shall designate
‖q(D|F )‖ =
{
q(D|F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F
}
a matrix of conditional probabilities of E-set-decisions D ⊆ D answering coincidence of a
set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. This matrix has the greatest valuable conditional E-
distributions (?) as its lines.
Each of us has more or less sufficient experience of E-decisions-making valuable for
us which answer on a call of daily events-circumstances. We shall take advantage of this
experience for designing two methods of E-decisions-making which any reasonable subject
can quite apply in his own event-based practice.
5.5. The first method
Let’s assume that the matrix
‖val(d, F )‖ = {val(d, F ), (d, F ) ∈ D× 2F},
is known and made of values val(d, F ) of a real function
val : D× 2F → R,
4Here the reduced designations for events-terraces, generated by various sets of events D and F, are used:
ter(D) = terD(D), ter(F ) = terF(F ).
5On the basis of the greatest value principle.
6which are interpreted as a degree of value (by the reasonable subject) of an eventological
choice of event-decision d ∈ D at coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. Thus
positive values val are interpreted as a degree of value of outcome, and negative — as a
degrees of absence of value of the outcome for the reasonable subject.
When val(d, F ) > 0 an event-decision d ∈ D can be valuably chosen by the reasonable
subject at coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F. In other words, events-
decisions combine from corresponding events-terraces ter(F ), for which val(d, F ) > 0 and
are defined by formulas consequently:
d =
∑
F : val(d,F )>0
ter(F ), d ∈ D.
Let’s designate
DF = {d : val(d, F ) > 0} ⊆ D
is a set of events-decisions for which val is positive at the given coincidence of a set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F. Then conditional E-distribution of all set of events-decisions D at the
coincidence of a set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F is a singular E-distribution
q(D|F ) = δ(D,DF ) =
{
1, D = DF ,
0, otherwise,
(◦)
where δ is the delta-function, or the Kronecker’s6 symbol.
5.6. The second method
For each set of events-decisions D ⊆ D and each coincidence of events-circumstances F ⊆ F
we shall define value of function val by formulas
val(D,F ) =
∑
X⊆D
val(X,F ) =

val(∅, F ) +
∑
d∈D
val(d, F ), D 6= ∅,
val(∅, F ), otherwise,
which together taken form a matrix of values
‖val(D,F )‖ = {val(D,F ) : D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}. (val)
Let’s designate
val(F ) =
∑
D: val(D,F )>0
val(D,F )
the sum of all positive values of function val(D,F ) for data F ⊆ F. We shall define now
for everyone F ⊆ F a conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) as follows: at val(F ) = 0 by the
formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
1, D = ∅,
0, otherwise,
(◦◦)
6Kronecker, Leopold (1823–1891) was a German mathematician; the basic works on algebra and theory
of numbers.
7and at val(F ) > 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
val(D,F )/val(F ), val(F ) > 0,
0, otherwise.
(◦◦′)
Thus the second method unlike the first one suggests to describe E-behaviour of the
reasonable subject at each coincidence of events-circumstances as a non-singular conditional
E-distribution. The second method considers the situation which is more general and offers
such way of an eventological choice of the reasonable subject when at each coincidence of
events-circumstances the reasonable subject chooses his E-behaviour how a conditional E-
distribution of the general character «prompts» to him. Thus his own E-distribution (defining
his eventological choice within the limits of a set of events-circumstances F) is defined by
formulas of full probability
q(D) =
∑
F⊆F
q(D|F )p(F ), D ⊆ D.
5.7. The eventological H-theorem
The eventological H-theorem [5] is an eventological generalization of the Boltzmann’s7 H-
theorem from the statistical mechanics; a mathematical substantiation of the eventological
law uniting eventological analogue of the second law of thermodynamics: «increasing entropy
in the closed thermodynamic non-alive system» with its eventological contrast: «decreasing
entropy (increasing negentropy [7]) in the open living system»; proves application of Gibbsean
and «antiGibbsean» E-distributions [1] of sets of events (minimizing a relative entropy8) as
statistical models of event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject aspiring an equilibrium
eventological choice between his event-based perception and his event-based activity in various
spheres of his co-being; the formulation and the proof of the eventological H-theorem essential-
ly base on eventological principles [6] with which the eventology [1] begins.
Theorem (the eventological H-theorem). Let (Ω,F,P) is the E-space, X ⊆ F is
the finite set of events, V(X) is the limited set-function9 on 2X, p∗(X) is some fixed E-
distribution10 on 2X, and E-distributions11 p(X) on 2X provide average value of the set-
function V(X) at the given level
〈V〉 =
∑
X⊆X
p(X)V(X). (V)
Then a minimum of a relative entropy
H p
p∗
=
∑
X⊆X
p(X) ln
p(X)
p∗(X)
→ min
p
7Boltzmann, Ludwig Eduard (1844–1906) was the great Austrian physicist famous for his founding
contributions in the fields of statistical mechanics and statistical thermodynamics; he first stated the
logarithmic connection between entropy and probability in his kinetic theory of gases; he stated his famous
H-theorem, theoretical basis of the second law of thermodynamics.
8Gibbsean and «antiGibbsean» E-distributions minimize a relative entropy between two E-distributions:
the E-distribution of event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject and his own E-distribution.
9This set-function is interpreted as a function of value (for the reasonable subject) of coming a set of
events X ⊆ X.
10This E-distribution is interpreted as an own E-distribution of the reasonable subject.
11These E-distributions are interpreted as E-distributions of an event-based behaviour of reasonable
subjects.
8among E-distributions p is achieved on Gibbsean and antiGibbsean E-distributions of a kind:
p(X) =
1
Zp∗
exp
{
− βV(X)
}
p∗(X), X ⊆ X, β ≥ 0,
p(X) =
1
Zp∗
exp
{
γV(X)
}
p∗(X), X ⊆ X, γ ≥ 0,
which can be copied without the normalizing multiplier 1/Zp∗ in the equivalent form:
p(X)
p(∅) = exp
{
− β(V(X)− V(∅))
}p∗(X)
p∗(∅) , X ⊆ X,
p(X)
p(∅) = exp
{
γ(V(X)− V(∅))
}p∗(X)
p∗(∅) , X ⊆ X.
5.8. The method based on the eventological H-theorem
We form the new set of events
X = D+ F
by the operation of union of the set of events-decisions D and the set of events-circumstances
F. To each pair of subsets of events-decisions D ⊆ D and events-circumstances F ⊆ F the
subset of events
X = X ∩D+X ∩ F = D + F ⊆ X
one-to-one corresponds. The E-distribution {p(X), X ⊆ X} of the set of events X is the
joint E-distribution
{pi(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}
of two sets of events D and F, which have been defined (pi) in the paragraph 5.3., as
pi(D,F ) = P (terD(D) ∩ terF(F )) = P (terX(X)) = p(X), X ⊆ X.
Eventological principles [5] follows, that on all subsets of set of events X the function of
values is defined:
V(X), X ⊆ X,
values of which serve as elements of the matrix of values ‖val(D,F )‖ of pairs of events from
sets D and F which have been defined (val) in the paragraph 5.6., as
V(X) = V(D + F ) = val(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F.
Let’s designate
{p∗(X), X ⊆ X} = {p∗(D + F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F}
the own E-distribution of the reasonable subject which can be estimated from his own
historical statistics
{terX(Xt), t ∈ T} = {terD+F(Dt + Ft), t ∈ T}
received for some previous time interval T .
By virtue of the eventological H-theorem the event-based behaviour of the reasonable
subject at given:
9• the own E-distribution p∗;
• the function of value V;
• the fixed level of average value 〈V〉
should submit to the E-distribution of a kind
p(D + F )
p(∅) = exp
{
α(V(D + F )− V(∅))
}p∗(D + F )
p∗(∅) , D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F, (H)
where
• values of function of value V(X) are interpreted by a double way:
? V(X) > 0 is a value of perception of the set of events X ⊆ X,
? V(X) < 0 is a value of creation of the set of events X ⊆ X;
• the parameter α > 0 characterizes the inverse average ability of the reasonable subject
to perceive and to create sets of events.
In particular the E-distribution (H) follows, that at the coincidence of the set of events-
circumstances F ⊆ F (p(F ) > 0) the event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject should
submit to the greatest valuable conditional E-distribution (see (?) in the paragraph 5.4.) of
a kind: {
q(D|F ) = p(D + F )
p(F )
, D ⊆ D
}
, (H?)
which serves as the eventological instruction for the reasonable subject and defines, what
E-decisions have the greatest value as his event-based answer to a call of set of events of
circumstances F ⊆ F.
6. Example of E-decisions-making
Let’s consider a situation when the reasonable subject is making E-decisions on his behaviour
in the financial or stock market, for example, within the limits of the tenders on currency
or stock exchange. The reasonable subject is making E-decisions on the basis of his own
historical E-statistics {ter(Ft) : t ∈ T} about the finite set of events-circumstances F. These
events-circumstances selected by the reasonable subject came or did not come during the
moments of time t ∈ T from some finite set T before the moment of the E-decisions-making.
One events-circumstances F are generated by technical characteristics others are generated
by fundamental characteristics of the tenders and are called as technical or fundamental
events-circumstances accordingly.
6.1. Technical events-circumstances
Let’s designate {at, t ∈ T} a set of stock quotes of one kind or a rate of one currency in
relation to another, and {bt, t ∈ T} a set of volumes of their sales during the corresponding
moments of time t ∈ T . We shall designate also
{a(1)t , t ∈ T}, {a(2)t , t ∈ T},
{b(1)t , t ∈ T}, {b(2)t , t ∈ T}
10
corresponding «sliding averages» of stock quotes and sales volumes accordingly for n1 + 1
and n2 + 1 at the previous moments of time:
a
(1)
t =
1
n1 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n1
aτ , a
(2)
t =
1
n2 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n2
aτ ,
b
(1)
t =
1
n1 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n1
bτ , b
(2)
t =
1
n2 + 1
t∑
τ=t−n2
bτ .
On the basis of these characteristics of the tenders it is possible to define three technical
events-circumstances:
f (1) =
{
at > a(1)t
}
, f (2) =
{
at > a(2)t
}
, f (3) =
{
a
(1)
t > a
(2)
t
}
.
6.2. Fundamental events-circumstances
In the example fundamental events-circumstances are defined as follows:
f (4) =
⋃
f∈F(4)
f, f (5) =
⋃
f∈F(5)
f, f (6) =
⋃
f∈F(4)
f.
Each of these three events-circumstances corresponds to coming even one12 events-circumstan-
ces f ∈ F(i) from a set of events13 F(i), i = 4, 5, 6, coming in three corresponding spheres of
a society — economic, political and social one and the most valuable to increase of quotes of
the financial tool considered.
6.3. The set of events-circumstances
In the example the set of events-circumstances is made by the reasonable subject of six
events-circumstances:
F =
{
f (1), f (2), f (3), f (4), f (5), f (6)
}
,
among which three: f (1), f (2) and f (3) are technical and three: f (4), f (5) and f (6) are fundamen-
tal. Thus, for the E-decisions-making the reasonable subject is going to analyze events-
circumstances in the currency or stock market through a «prism» of the sextet of events F
selected by him. In other words, the reasonable subject is going to consider only 64 = 26
variants of a coincidence of events-circumstances F ⊆ F, or, that is the same, a coming 64
corresponding events-terraces:
ter(F ) =
⋂
f∈F
f
⋂
f∈F c
f c, F ⊆ F,
where f c = Ω− f is a complement of the event-circumstance f up to Ω, and F c = F− F is
a complement of the set of events-circumstances F up to F.
12The logic statement «coming even one event» corresponds to the set-operation «union of events» which
here should be considered only as popular, but rather particular variant of the any set-operation also quite
admissible for definition of events-circumstances in a problem of E-decisions-making.
13Economic, political and social events-circumstances, forming sets F(i), i = 4, 5, 6, should be defined and
chosen by the reasonable subject before he will start to make the E-decisions.
11
6.4. The set of events-decisions
In the example the set of events-decisions of the reasonable subject, where he makes E-
decisions in the currency or stock market, consists of two events-decisions:
D = {d+, d−},
where
d+ = {a sale of the financial tool},
d− = {a purchase of the financial tool}.
In any situation the doublet of events-decisions D partitions the space of outcomes of Being
Ω on 4 = 22 events-terraces each of which can be written down in a canonical form [1]:
ter(D) =
⋂
d∈D
d
⋂
d∈Dc
dc, D ⊆ D.
According to their definition these events-terraces are easy for writing out in a form of
intersection of two events and for resulting their obvious interpretation also:
• ter(∅) = (d+)c ∩ (d−)c — to do nothing,
• ter({d+}) = d+ ∩ (d−)c — only to sell,
• ter({d−}) = (d+)c ∩ d− — only to buy,
• ter({d+, d−}) = d+ ∩ d− — to sell and to buy.
Interpretation of event-terrace ter({d+, d−}) «to sell and to buy» can to mean, for example,
that the reasonable subject sells the one part of the financial tools, and buys the other part.
If it is impossible it is necessary to assume that events-decisions are not intersected, i.e.
that
ter({d+, d−}) = d+ ∩ d− = ∅.
The doublet of not intersected events-decisions D partitions the space of outcomes of Being
Ω on three events-terraces only:
• ter(∅) = (d+)c ∩ (d−)c — to do nothing,
• ter({d+}) = d+ — only to sell,
• ter({d−}) = d− — only to buy.
6.5. The matrix of values
In the example it is offered to estimate the matrix of values for the reasonable subject
‖val(d, F )‖ = {val(d, F ), (d, F ) ∈ D× 2F}
from historical statistics {
ter(Ft) : Ft ⊆ F
}
.
An each element of the matrix is statistically estimated under the formula:
val(d, F ) = (−1)δ(d,d−)
(
1
|TF |
∑
t∈TF
(at − at−1)
)
, (¯)
12
where TF =
{
t ∈ T Ft = F
} ⊆ T is the subset of the moments from T in which the
coincidence of events-обстоятельств Ft coincided with F ⊆ F, and |TF | is a number of such
moments (power of the subset TF ).
Now for each set of events-decisionsD ⊆ D and for each coincidence of events-circumstances
F ⊆ F the function val, earlier defined on D × 2F, is defined on greater set 2D × 2F under
formulas
val(D,F ) =
∑
X⊆D
val(X,F ) =

val(∅, F ) +
∑
d∈D
val(d, F ), D 6= ∅,
val(∅, F ), otherwise.
(¯¯)
These values of val, taken all together, form the matrix of values
‖val(D,F )‖ = {val(D,F ) (D,F ) ∈ 2D × 2F}.
The further estimation of conditional E-distributions of the reasonable subject is spent
methods using elements of the matrix of degrees of values estimated under formulas (¯)
and/or (¯¯) are put.
6.6. The first method
An each event-decision d ∈ D is chosen by the reasonable subject at the coincidence of
events-circumstances F ⊆ F for which val(d, F ) > 0, in other words, it is defined by a
formula:
d =
∑
F : val(d,F )>0
ter(F ), d ∈ D.
Let
DF = {d : val(d, F ) > 0} ⊆ D
is a set of all such events-decisions for which val is positive at the given F ⊆ F. Thus, the
reasonable subject at the given F ⊆ F creates the event-terrace
ter(DF ) =
⋂
d∈DF
d
⋂
d∈(DF )c
dc,
corresponding to the set of events-decisions DF , i.e. he creates all events-decisions from DF
and does not create any event-decision from (DF )c = D−DF .
6.7. The second method
Let
valΣ(F ) =
∑
D: val(D,F )>0
val(D,F )
is a sum of all positive values of function val(D,F ) for the given F ⊆ F. Now for everyone
F ⊆ F the conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) is defined:
• at valΣ(F ) = 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
1, D = ∅,
0, otherwise;
(◦◦)
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• at valΣ(F ) > 0 by the formula:
q(D|F ) =
{
val(D,F )/val(F ), val(F ) > 0,
0, otherwise.
(◦◦′)
This conditional E-distribution q(D|F ) generalizes the behaviour of the reasonable subject
recommended by the first method, indicating for everyone D ⊆ D probabilities q(D|F ) of
creating the given set of events-decisions by the reasonable subject (under the condition of
coming the set of events-circumstances F ⊆ F).
In other words the second method offers for the reasonable subject (if to use terminology
of the games theory) not «pure» strategies (as the first method) but a «mixed» strategy of
his event-based behaviour which is defined by the conditional E-distribution {q(D|F ), D ⊆
D}. This fact that the reasonable subject is capable to carry out an eventological choice14
of events-decisions according to the conditional E-distribution follows from the general E-
principles [1, 5].
6.8. The method based on the eventological H-theorem
Let’s
1) define on 2D+F the function of value V by formulas
V(D + F ) = val(D,F ), D ⊆ D, F ⊆ F,
where val(D,F ) are calculated by formulas (¯) and (¯¯);
2) estimate the own E-distribution p∗(D+F ) of the reasonable subject from the historical
statistics
{terD+F(Dt + Ft), t ∈ T}
of his event-based behaviour D, answered calls F for some previous interval T ;
3) fix some average level of valuable preferences of the reasonable subject 〈V〉.
Then the eventological H-theorems (H) follows that at the coincidence of the set of
events-circumstances F ⊆ F (p(F ) > 0) the event-based behaviour of the reasonable subject
should submit to the greatest valuable conditional E-distribution (see (?) in the paragraph
5.4.) of a kind: {
q(D|F ) = p(D + F )
p(F )
, D ⊆ D
}
, (H?)
which serves as the eventological instruction for the reasonable subject and defines, what
E-decisions have the greatest value as his event-based answer to a call of the set of events of
circumstances F ⊆ F.
14The some part of reasonable subjects does not trust this ability of their reason and are convinced, that
for their eventological choice they need to do nothing except for as «to throw a coin», and it is vain.
14
7. Conclusion
When the reasonable subject makes a decision at coincidence of sets of events-circumstances,
submitting to the E-distribution, at his disposal as the current result of his event-based
experience is available the own set of events-decisions with the E-distribution which defines
his eventological choice. The joint E-distribution of these two sets of events describes event-
based behaviour of the reasonable subject — making the most valuable event-based decisions
by him in various circumstances of his co-being.
The offered event-based sight at the decision-making, basing on the eventological H-
theorem [6], a basis of the eventological theory of decision-making which unifies and expands
opportunities of the classical theory, allowing to compare situations of making the most
valuable event-based decisions by various reasonable subjects at various event-based circum-
stances in eventological manner.
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